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Abstract 
Using data from government sources (FRED, BEA, BLS), the thesis explores the 
underlying reasons for declining U.S. economic growth. A long standing trend of annual 
3% growth no longer seems to hold true for the economy. The paper summarizes current 
theory as to why the growth has slowed and finds new explanations by analyzing the 
various major industries which make up GDP. The results show that sectoral shifts in 
employment from high paying industries to low paying industries help to explain a 
significant portion of the decline in national growth rates. The decline in growth is 
primarily driven by about ten poor performing states. 
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I. Introduction 
If you followed the coverage of the recent presidential election, there is one topic 
or theme that every candidate, regardless of political party or orientation, agrees on: The 
U.S. economy is in poor shape. While the perceived causes that resulted in this situation 
and the severity of the situation vary across politicians, the overall message is dire. Here is 
a sample of a few: 
“This country is in big trouble. We don’t win anymore. We lose to China. We lose to 
Mexico. Both in trade and at the border. We lose to everybody.” - Donald Trump 
 
“The greed of the billionaire class, the greed of Wall Street is destroying this economy.”                      
- Bernie Sanders  
 
“This country is running out of time. We can’t afford to have another four years like the 
last eight.” - Marco Rubio 
 
“We’re on the verge of economic collapse.” - Ben Carson 
 
“The sad reality is big government, massive taxes, massive regulation, doesn’t work.”                          
- Ted Cruz  
 
“We must raise incomes for hard working Americans, so they can afford a middle-class 
life.” - Hillary Clinton 
 
“We should be growing at four percent, not this new normal.” - Jeb Bush 
 
This kind of skepticism and doomsday mongering is in sharp contrast to the picture 
painted by the primary, main indicators of economic well-being. On election day, the 
picture with respect to the economy was as follows: 
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Table 1: Main Economic Indicators, United States, November 2016 
 
Economic Indicator Value 
Real GDP Growth Rate, 2016, Q3 2.9% 
Unemployment Rate, October 2016 4.9% 
Inflation Rate, October 2016 1.6% 
10-Year Treasury Bond 2.3% 
 
All of these values are quite close to what you would expect to find at full 
employment with low inflation. As a matter of fact, the literature on voting/approval 
functions would suggest a win for the incumbent were it not for the fact that the sitting 
president was not running for re-election, and that the same party had been in power for 
two terms.1 
Several business economists have pointed out this fact recently. Mercile (2016) 
states that the U.S labor market is performing well. The gap between the actual 
unemployment rate (adjusted for involuntary part time workers and discouraged workers) 
and the unemployment rate at full employment (natural rate or NAIRU) was 2.6 percentage 
points at the start of 2015. At the beginning of 2016, that gap had narrowed to 1.3 
percentage points and is predicted to reach zero by the end of this year. Schniepp (2016) 
points out that help wanted indices and real wage increases are at levels corresponding to 
                                               
1 The Fair model also has an important variable in its specification: the so-called “Good News” 
variable. This variable increases by one if growth in per capita income is 3.2% or higher during a 
quarter. The equivalent in real GDP growth would be roughly 4.2%, which is hard to obtain if 
economic growth has slowed down when compared to historical averages. The previous 
administration only had two quarters of such high real growth. (Fair 1996) 
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full employment. Moreover, the positive labor market picture coincides with real growth 
in the U.S economy, and we have not seen a recession in about seven years. Note that in 
February 2017 the current expansion, which started in July of 2009, will become the second 
longest expansion in U.S. history. From a consumer standpoint, consumer confidence is at 
levels not seen since the beginning of the Great Recession and personal consumption 
expenditures have been rising steadily as well. 
In the words of this year’s Literature Nobel prize winner Bob Dylan, “How does it 
feel?” Apparently, “not so good” or Hillary Clinton would be president by now. So, what 
is the underlying source of the malcontent? Maybe politicians simply think that they must 
spread negativity to create the image of a “savior” for themselves. In that case, it would be 
easy to dismiss their claims as groundless. However, that is not the case. Instead, there is 
solid evidence that something is fundamentally different regarding the U.S. economy 
today.  
From 1896 to 2008, real GDP grew at approximately 3% per year. There are 
obvious fluctuations around the trend line that occur with each business cycle, the most 
obvious being the Great Depression. However, overall economic growth trended at 3% for 
120 years. Starting the numerical analysis at a more recent date (1968), trend growth is also 
3% with a variation width of plus or minus 3%.  
Figure 1 displays actual real GDP, trend growth, and the bandwidth of 3%.2 There 
are a few years with real growth domestic product (GDP) levels exceeding or falling below 
the 3% bounds. However, periods of extreme loss are subsequently offset by abnormally 
                                               
2 Trend growth was generated by regressing the logarithm of real GDP on a linear time trend. 
Predicted values from the regression were then used to convert the numbers into $2009 GDP. 
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high growth. This pattern changed with the onset of the Great Recession. At that point the 
economy dipped well below the lower bound initially but was expected to rebound 
subsequently. Unfortunately, the required strong recovery to accomplish this return never 
materialized. Had the U.S. economy grown at levels just exceeding 3%, then we would 
have observed actual GDP slowly inching back towards the trend line from 1968-2008, but 
that did not happen. Instead average real GDP growth during this long expansionary phase 
has been only about 2%. As a result, the gap between actual real GDP and the trend line 
continues to widen.3 Currently, U.S. real GDP lies almost $2 trillion  (in numbers: 
$2,000,000,000,000 or about 11%) below the level it would have been, had we returned to 
Figure 1: Real GDP, United States, Billions of $2009, 1968-2015 
                                               
3 “GDP gap” actually is a technical term, and refers to ((Y-Yp)/Yp), where Y is real GDP and Yp 
is potential (“full employment”) real GDP. The gap is measured in percent. 
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 the 3% trend line. Further, there does not seem to be any tendency to return into the band; 
instead the economy seems to be moving further away. 
To put matters into perspective: real GDP would have to grow at a rate of about 
4.2% for an entire decade, with no recession intervening, in order to catch up to the trend 
line by 2026. In essence, this means we have permanently departed from the trend line, and 
there is little to no hope of returning to the 3% band.  
GDP is a comprehensive measure of the economy because it represents the total 
value added of all products. While a low unemployment rate may be seen as evidence of a 
strong economy, real GDP4 and real GDP growth are better indicators because they can 
identify structural shifts occurring in the economy in a way that unemployment cannot. 
Imagine a worker earning $100,000 per year is laid off and quickly finds a new job paying 
$50,000 per year. In this case unemployment and employment levels have not changed, 
but GDP has fallen because GDP is equal to national income by accounting identity.5 By 
intuition, GDP is the value of every final good sold in the economy. Money is being 
exchanged in the sales of final products, and every cost to a buyer is income to the seller 
(CEPR 2012). Therefore, declines in real per capita GDP can be thought of as a decline in 
the real income or standard of living of the average American.  
Real GDP per capita peaked before the recession at about $50,000 per person in the 
fourth quarter of 2007 and did not return to that level until six years later, during the fourth 
                                               
4 Per capita GDP, or real GDP divided by the population of a country, was seen by Adam Smith 
as a proxy for the “Wealth of a Nation.” 
5 Technically speaking, this is not quite true since income can be received for sales generated by 
companies operating abroad, but owned by U.S. citizens. Similarly, GDP also includes sales by 
companies with foreign ownerships in the U.S. I will ignore the difference between GNP and 
GDP here. 
6 
 
quarter of 2013. This means that the average American did not see a raise beyond their 
2007 income for over six years. Furthermore, income is not evenly distributed. Growth in 
per capita GDP has been low since 2013, and the median household has barely seen any 
raise over the last nine years because growth in income was concentrated in the upper fifth 
percentile of the income distribution (“Lost Decade”). While real GDP is currently not 
declining, it certainly is not growing at a pace that Americans have become accustomed to, 
which perhaps explains why many Americans “feel” like we are still in a recession. The 
natural research question that evolves from here must be: what happened? Something 
fundamentally has changed in the U.S. economy in terms of output growth. The purpose 
of this paper is to explain why a forty year “rule” that seemed to govern U.S. economic 
behavior has now vanished. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section II discusses some of the prevailing thoughts 
on declines in real GDP growth rates as well as discuss major macroeconomic trends in the 
labor market. Next, section III attempts to explain what is causing the declines in growth 
rates as well describe some major trends in the U.S. economy. The analysis will explore 
real GDP as a function of industries and hours. Section IV breaks down GDP growth rate 
trends by state. A final section, section V, concludes on the results and discusses avenues 
for further research into the topic. 
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II. Literature Review 
As you can see from Jeb Bush’s quote above, there is an awareness that the low 
growth rates we are seeing are abnormal and problematic. In fact, some of the quotes 
offered by politicians provide their insight into what they think the explanation is. Ted Cruz 
sights government regulation as the problem, while Bernie Sanders blames Wall Street and 
corporate greed. Perhaps the issue is a bit more complex than what either of them present.  
According the Robert Gordon, an economist at the University of Chicago, 
economic growth is mistakenly considered an economic certainty. He hypothesizes that 
there are indeed several current day macroeconomic factors slowing down U.S. growth: 
rising costs and falling quality of education, rising inequality stemming from globalization, 
environmental regulation and taxes, overhang of consumer and government debt, and an 
aging population (Gordon 2012). Many of these factors are the kinds of topics that 
politicians will often point to when discussing a revitalization of the U.S. economy.  
However, in addition to these economic “headwinds” Gordon claims that the 
problem is much more fundamental and unfixable. He says that the main driver in historical 
U.S. economic growth is innovation. There have been three industrial revolutions in 
modern history during which major innovations were concentrated. The first industrial 
revolution occurred from 1750 to 1830 and saw the creation of steam engines, cotton 
spinning, and railroads. The second industrial revolution occurred from 1870 to 1900 and 
saw the critical inventions of electricity, running water, and the internal combustion engine 
(Gordon 2016). The innovations of the second industrial revolution radically transformed 
human life. Inventions such as home appliances, airplanes, air conditioning, just to name a 
few, were all made possible by the main ideas that came out of the era. Gordon 
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hypothesizes that the effects of the second industrial revolution last well through the 
1960’s. This might seem like a stretch, but there is definitely some logic to his claim. For 
example, rural America did not fully receive electricity until the mid-1960’s (Genzel 2009).  
The essential idea is that economic growth is driven by a major innovation and the 
resulting improvements on that innovation. The cause of the slow growth, put simply, is 
that the modern world has not seen a critical innovation in quite some time. There was a 
third industrial revolution related primarily to technology and computers from about 1960 
to 2000; however, the incremental improvements on the boom in technology are 
increasingly focused on communication and entertainment. It’s not to say that the 
smartphone, for example, is not a great invention, but its improvement on life during the 
flip-phone days pales in comparison to the improvement on life cars created by replacing 
horses (Gordon 2012).  
The diminishing returns on innovation can be seen in the following graph of U.S. 
real GDP since 1947. The y-axis is on a logarithmic scale, so constant growth rates will be 
graphed as straight lines.6 The plus and minus three percent window with 1968 as the base 
year is also included. The concave down shape of the curve shows the declining U.S. 
growth rate overtime. GDP between 1947 and 1968 grew at about 4.0%, between 1968 and 
2008 grew at about 3.0%, and between 2008 and 2015 grew at about 1.2%. 
 
 
 
                                               
6 The greater the space between grid lines the greater the percent change in the value. 
9 
 
Figure 2: Real GDP, United States, Millions of $2009, 1947-2015 
Innovation must certainly influence growth rates, but it also has had an impact on 
employment in the modern world. MIT economist David Autor explains that the rise of 
technology has fundamentally changed the roles of labor in our economy. Autor groups 
employment into four categories: non-routine cognitive, non-routine manual, routine 
cognitive, and routine manual. He states that the routine cognitive and routine manual jobs 
are the type of jobs typically occupied by middle class workers. They are procedural type 
jobs such as factory employees or administrative roles in offices. Because these types of 
jobs are routine, they are easily replaceable with technology. An example of this would be 
a typist being replaced by a copy machine or a factory worker being replaced by new 
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equipment (Canon 2013). As the prices of machines have fallen relative to the price of 
workers, these types of routine jobs have been automated.  
Non-routine cognitive tasks are jobs that involve high level thinking and analysis. 
They often require higher education, and they pay well. Also, they are not easily automated; 
a robot cannot be a CEO or represent someone in court. Non-routine manual tasks are jobs 
that involve little ability, but are difficult to automate (Canon 2013). A good example of 
this is a janitor. Since almost anyone can clean and lock up a building, it is not a high 
paying job; however, it is also not easily automated.  
The automation of middle paying jobs has caused a shift in labor from middle 
paying jobs to both low and high paying jobs - what Autor calls job polarization. In a paper 
written by Autor (2013), he explores the effects of international trade and offshoring, the 
changing roles of unions, and the minimum wage on job and polarization. He concludes 
that the key contributor to job polarization is the automaton of routine work (Autor 2013).  
Autor never claims that automation is contributing to unemployment (technological 
advancement and unemployment rates are not correlated at all); rather, he states that it is 
contributing to structural changes in the employment market. Structural changes in the 
employment market are directly connected to real GDP growth. If jobs were moving from 
middle paying sectors to high paying sectors, then perhaps we would expect GDP to grow 
faster than it had historically. This implies that jobs have probably switched into less 
productive sectors of the economy. A Wall Street Journal Article from 2013 states:  
“Economic changes over the past decade have led to a decline across the country 
in well-paying jobs, such as those in manufacturing, and an increase in jobs that 
pay less, such as those in hotels and food services . . . Positions are increasingly 
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being filled not with the young and inexperienced, but by older and more skilled 
workers who can’t find other jobs.”  
Overall, current research examines extensively low GDP growth rates and sectoral 
shifts in employment. However, the majority of the research analyzes the two components 
individually. This paper will add to existing literature by drawing connections between the 
two with the goal of understanding of our, to quote Jeb Bush, “new normal.” 
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III. Explaining the Gap7  
A. Industry Breakdown 
One of the benefits to analyzing GDP is that it can be decomposed by industry to 
give a more complete image of what aspects of the economy have really changed. 
Decomposing GDP by industry can be described by the following: 
𝑌 ≡ ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝐸𝑖
15
𝑖=1
∗
𝐸𝑖
𝐸
∗ 𝐸                       (1) 
 
Where “Y” corresponds to Income, “E” corresponds to employment and “i” corresponds to 
one of the 15 major NAICS statistical industries.8 There are fifteen major industries: 
● Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate (FIRE) 
● Government 
● Professional and Business Services 
● Manufacturing 
● Education 
● Wholesale Trade 
● Retail Trade 
● Information 
● Construction 
● Leisure and Hospitality 
● Transportation 
● Mining 
● Other Services 
● Utilities  
                                               
7 Analysis in this paper is done annually with the most recent data point being 2015 
8 Yi/Ei can be thought of as output per worker by industry - a measure of productivity by industry. 
In this section I will use output per worker and productivity interchangeably. E/Ei is the share of 
total employment held by each industry. The North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS) was established in 1997, and is used to provide U.S. industry time series data. It 
improved on the long-standing Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system. 
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● Agriculture  
The fall in real GDP growth rates from about 3% to 2% can be thought of as a gap 
between the 3% trend line shown in Figure 1 and the actual current level of real GDP. Real 
GDP as of 2015 was about $16.4 trillion, which leaves a gap of 13% of the trended real 
GDP. If the gap is based off the lower 3% bound, then the gap shrink to 8%. Either way it 
is substantial. 
One explanation for the decline is that the economy in general has slowed down 
across all fifteen industries. If this were true, then we should see consistent real GDP 
growth rates of about 2% per year in each industry. However, average industry growth 
rates post-recession have varied widely among the different industries. Figure 3 shows 
average real GDP growth rates from 2010 to 2015. The growth rates vary as much as 4.5 
percentage points across the fifteen industries. Some industries far outperform the average 
U.S. growth rate of 2% during the period.  
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Figure 3: Post Recession Average Growth Rates, United States, 2010-2015 
Unfortunately, the industries that outperform the U.S. economy and the 3% 
historical trend tend to be smaller, such as Agriculture and Mining, so their effect on overall 
growth rates is minimal. Figure 3’s x-axis is organized by total real GDP share in 2015 
from left to right. With the exception of Professional and Business Services, the larger 
industries perform well below the 3% goal. It’s worth noting that the five largest industries 
(FIRE through Education and Health) account for 65% of total real GDP. Overall, the 
figure shows that falling growth rates can certainly be attributed to specific industries rather 
than to the economy as a whole. 
A more nuanced way to analyze real GDP is to look at it as a function of industry 
output per worker and employment in each industry. This is the same as what was described 
in Equation (1). Holding each component of GDP constant at a historical level and 
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allowing the others to change as they did in actuality will provide a clue as to which 
component has negatively impacted growth. For example, if output per worker (Yi/Ei) is 
held constant at 2007 levels, and share of total employment by industry (Ei/E) and 
employment (E) are allowed to adjust normally, this will give us a new estimated real GDP 
value for every period after 2007. These estimated real GDP values are presented in the 
following Tables 2 and 3: 
Table 2: Yi/Ei constant at 2007 levels, United States, Millions of $2009   
Year Estimated Real GDP Actual Real GDP Estimated/Actual 
2008  $          14,779,607  $          14,842,340 99.6% 
2009  $          14,028,375  $      14,418,738 97.3% 
2010  $          13,864,061  $          14,733,166 94.1% 
2011  $          14,011,999  $      14,945,815 93.8% 
2012  $          14,235,735  $          15,239,418 93.4% 
2013  $          14,443,157  $      15,421,934 93.7% 
2014  $          14,684,860  $          15,753,678 93.2% 
2015  $          14,940,151  $      16,124,135 92.7% 
 
With output per worker held constant at 2007 levels, real GDP is far below what it 
currently is today. If the real GDP estimate were higher than actual real GDP that would 
imply one of two things: either productivity has fallen and real GDP growth is being driven 
by large increases in employment, or productivity has fallen and real GDP growth is being 
driven by a massive movement of employment from low productive sectors to high 
productive sectors. In reality, output per worker has risen nationally since 2007, which is 
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why holding worker productivity constant did not explain the gap between real GDP and 
the historical trend line. 
Table 3: Ei/E constant at 2007 levels, United States, Millions of $2009 
Year Estimated Real GDP Actual Real GDP Estimated/Actual 
2008  $          14,899,922  $         14,842,340 100.4% 
2009  $          14,604,147  $         14,418,738 101.3% 
2010  $          15,019,732  $         14,733,166 101.9% 
2011  $          15,257,155  $         14,945,815 102.1% 
2012  $          15,574,704  $         15,239,418 102.2% 
2013  $          15,794,370  $         15,421,934 102.4% 
2014  $          16,162,691  $         15,753,678 102.6% 
2015  $          16,602,313  $         16,124,135 103.0% 
 
Holding employment share by industry constant at 2007 levels does begin to 
explain the gap. If the share of each industry is held constant at its 2007 level, the ratio of 
estimated real GDP to actual real GDP slowly increases. In other words, estimated real 
GDP is growing faster than actual real GDP. If current industry employment shares were 
at their 2007 level, then real GDP in the U.S. would be about $16.6 trillion. 
Since estimated real GDP is higher than actual real GDP, this tells us that there was 
a structural shift in employment from more productive industries to less productive 
industries. The ratio between estimated and actual real GDP grows with each period in 
Table 3. This implies that the structural change in employment from high output per 
worker sectors to low output per worker sectors continued throughout the time period. 
Figure 4 helps to visualize the structural shifts in employment. I have selected the six 
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largest industries in terms of employment in 1998, which account for about 75% of total 
national employment. 
Figure 4: Share of Total Employment, United States, 1998-2015 
 
Downward movement in Figure 4 shows a falling share in employment for that 
industry. The big loser is Manufacturing, which falls from second place to last place in this 
group. The winners are Education and Health, Professional and Business Services, and 
Leisure and Hospitality. It is important to note that Manufacturing is a highly productive 
industry, and it is becoming more productive faster. The benefits of having employment 
share in Manufacturing over Professional and Business Services, Education and Health, 
and Leisure and Hospitality becomes apparent in Table 4.  
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Table 4: Y/E in select industries, United States, Millions $2009 
Year Manufacturing 
Professional and 
Business Services Education and Health 
Leisure and 
Hospitality 
2000 $           92,861 $                 84,622 $             60,479 $           43,923 
2003 $         112,494 $                 94,385 $             60,443 $           43,805 
2006 $         131,736 $                 94,367 $             61,554 $           43,640 
2009 $         145,741 $               100,225 $             61,854 $           39,951 
2012 $         153,335 $               103,503 $             60,831 $           41,849 
2015 $         155,147 $               103,633 $             61,077 $           40,824 
 
The fast growth of productivity in Manufacturing and Professional and Business 
Services contrasts the stagnation in Education and Health and Leisure and Hospitality. 
Manufacturing’s output per worker increases from about $92,000 per year in 2000 to 
$155,000 per year in 2015. During this same time period, its share of total employment 
plummeted from about 14% to 8.5%. Education and Health’s output per worker was 
essentially stagnate. During this same time period its share of employment increased from 
about 11.5% to 15.5%. These two simultaneous trends offer insight into the declining real 
GDP growth rates in the U.S. We’re simply not creating jobs in the “correct” industries.  
The loss of potential real GDP when a worker transitions from a Manufacturing job 
to a job in Health and Education or Leisure and Hospitality is very significant. The average 
output per worker in Manufacturing in 2015 was $155,000 per year, while the average 
output per worker in Leisure and Hospitality and in Education and Health was somewhere 
around $50,000 per year. So, about $100,000 in potential real GDP per year is lost every 
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time a single worker transitions from a Manufacturing job to a job in one of those 
industries. This loss, compounded over the last nine years, is what produces the larger 
estimated real GDP number in Table 3. 
Figure 4 begins in 1998 to show that the decline in Manufacturing employment 
share was not a product of the Great Recession. This was a trend that began long before 
the financial crisis and potentially before 1998.9 For this reason, Table 5 holds employment 
shares by industry constant at 1998 levels, and the resulting estimated real GDP is quite 
large at $17.2 trillion. 
Table 5: Ei/E constant at 1998 levels, United States, Millions $2009
10 
Year Estimated Real GDP Actual Real GDP Estimated/Actual 
2008  $          15,382,485  $          14,842,340 103.6% 
2009  $          15,090,733  $      14,418,738 104.7% 
2010  $          15,573,163  $          14,733,166 105.7% 
2011  $          15,806,524  $      14,945,815 105.8% 
2012  $          16,119,646  $          15,239,418 105.8% 
2013  $          16,371,608  $      15,421,934 106.2% 
2014  $          16,756,478  $          15,753,678 106.4% 
2015  $          17,214,757  $      16,124,135 106.8% 
 
                                               
9 Industry analysis in this paper cannot be done prior to 1998 because there is not an accurate way 
to connect the fifteen major NAICS industries with the SIC system. Several of the major SIC 
industries were deconstructed and spread out among the new major NAICS industries. Allocating 
GDP numbers from the decomposed SIC Industries to the major NAICS industries is impossible 
and would involve making assumptions about the share that each NAICS industry owns. 
10 I ran an iteration of Table 5 holding employment shares constant at every time period between 
1998 and 2007. The results from 1998 yielded the highest estimated real GDP figure, so for that 
reason I left the other iterations out of the paper. 
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The lower 3% bound of trended real GDP is about $17.7 trillion. Actual real GDP 
is about 10% below that mark, and estimated real GDP is about 3% below that mark. This 
means that 70% of the gap between current real GDP and its historical trend can be 
explained solely by structural changes in employment. Further, the average growth rate of 
estimated real GDP between 2010 and 2015 is 2.2%, which still leaves the economy 0.8 
percentage points below the historical trend, but is 0.3 percentage points above the realized 
growth rate between 2010 and 2015 of 1.9%. Essentially, this says that about 30% of the 
decline in growth rates can be explained by structural shifts in employment.11  
Since structural employment shifts begin in the 1990s it begs the question as to why 
the U.S. economy did not begin to see sub 3% growth rates far earlier. It seems logical that 
the gap should begin to appear when the structural changes begin. While the answer to that 
question is not the goal of this paper, one possible theory is that growth rates were 
essentially being propped up by low interest rates and the housing bubble. The Taylor Rule 
states that the Federal Funds Rate is a function of deviations from targeted inflation rates 
and maximum potential real GDP levels. If the Federal Reserve does not adjust the rate 
correctly, then there is a risk that the economy will “overheat” because a prolonged low 
interest rate environment encourages the formation of bubbles (Leamer 2009).  
                                               
11 The 30% number was calculated by taking the difference between average estimated real GDP 
growth, 2.2%, and average actual real GDP growth, 1.9%, and dividing by the difference between 
the average historical real GDP growth, 3%, and average actual GDP growth post-Great 
Recession, 1.9%. Which is: (2.2%-1.9%)/(3%-1.9%) = 27%, about 30%.   
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Figure 5: Federal Funds Rate, actual and counterfactual, %12 
While there have been many adjustments and critiques to the Taylor Rule as to how exactly 
it should be calculated, economists agree that rates were too low in the early to mid-2000’s. 
The conclusions from Table 5 that relate to 2010-2015 are consistent with the pre-
Recession period too. The 0.3 percentage point loss in growth that was discussed earlier 
holds true for the time period before the Great Recession as well. The average growth rate 
in estimated real GDP from 1999-2006 is 3% which is 0.3 percentage points above the 
realized average growth rate of 2.7%. So, the decline in real GDP growth rates caused by 
structural employment changes begins far prior to the Great Recession; however, it was 
being masked by the booming economy. As Manufacturing employment began in tumble 
in the late 90’s, the Construction industry was benefiting enormously from the low rates 
environment and the boom in housing. While overall employment grew by 3% between 
2000 and 2006, Construction employment grew by 13%. The Construction industry 
essentially “hid” some other underlying weaknesses in the economy. This is one possible 
explanation as to why growth rates did not begin to fall sooner. Perhaps Robert Gordon 
                                               
12 Source: John Taylor, “Housing and Monetary Policy,” Sept 2007 
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would say that the economy was still benefiting from the third industrial revolution in the 
late 1990’s and early 2000’s. 
There is one flaw in holding employment share constant and letting output per 
worker fluctuate normally. Output per worker is a function of industry employment and 
employment share is a function of industry employment. Some of the growth in 
productivity in Manufacturing were a result of not only rises in output but declines in 
employment too: 
↑ 𝑌𝑖
↓ 𝐸𝑖
=↑↑ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦                 (2) 
The productivity component of GDP benefits from falling industry employment, but 
usually this would be accompanied by a decline in the employment share of that industry. 
Since employment share is being held constant at historical levels, that decline never 
occurs. Therefore, the final GDP estimates in this scenario are artificially high. However, 
overall employment rises in most industries since 2007 and especially since 1998. In the 
cases where industry employment is rising the opposite effect occurs where the 
productivity goes down due to rising employment, but the share of employment is not 
increasing. Overall, these effects add a little bit of uncertainty to the estimated real GDP 
figures, but it is unclear in which direction they might be biased. 
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B. Hourly Breakdown 
Section II, A analyzed real GDP as a function of output and employment. Another 
common way to decompose real GDP is as a function of output per hour and hours worked. 
This yields the following:13 
𝑌 ≡ ∑
𝑌𝑖
𝐻𝑖
∗
𝐻𝑖
𝐸𝑖
15
𝑖=1
∗
𝐸𝑖
𝐸
∗ 𝐸                  (3) 
 Hours worked by full time and part time employees has fluctuated since 2000 with 
dips during recessions and large increases during expansionary periods. It is a rather 
volatile figure because it is affected by both employment and how “busy” businesses are. 
Regardless, the total number of hours worked in the U.S. has grown since 2000 despite two 
recessions. However, hours worked per employee has fallen since 2000 from 1,736 hours 
per year to 1,719 hours per year. Declines in hours worked per employee is a long-standing 
trend in the U.S. (in 1960, hours per employee per year was 2,112), so this finding is not 
surprising. Still, the decline helps motivate the question of if low real GDP growth rates 
are a product of declining hours worked by American workers. Holding hours per worker 
by industry constant at their levels in 2000 yields the following table14: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
13 Yi/Hi is output per hour by industry and a measure of productivity. I will use output per hour 
and productivity interchangeably in this section. 
14 Hours worked by NAICS industry is not available until 2000. The year 2000 was chosen to 
maximize as much as possible the long standing trend of declining hours per employee nationally.  
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Table 6: Hi/Ei constant at 2000 levels, United States, Millions $2009 
Date Estimated Real GDP Actual Real GDP Estimated/Actual 
2008  $          14,861,577  $          14,842,340 100.1% 
2009  $          14,552,159  $      14,418,738 100.9% 
2010  $          14,755,832  $          14,733,166 100.2% 
2011  $          14,874,315  $      14,945,815 99.5% 
2012  $          15,133,332  $          15,239,418 99.3% 
2013  $          15,310,593  $      15,421,934 99.3% 
2014  $          15,585,311  $          15,753,678 98.9% 
2015  $          15,956,750  $      16,124,135 99.0% 
 
It might seem surprising to see estimated real GDP below actual real GDP given 
the given fact that hours per worker fell nationally from 2000 to 2015; however, the 
declines nationally were small in the 15-year period. For estimated real GDP to be smaller 
than actual real GDP, hours per employee must have increased in the most productive 
industries. This indeed has occurred. For example, Manufacturing hours worked per 
employee increased from 1970 hours per year to 1993 hours per year while simultaneously 
increasing output from $55.72 per hour in 2000 to $77.83 per hour in 2015 
It is an interesting thought experiment to consider real GDP as a function of hours 
worked per employee, but in some sense it does not make sense because businesses 
themselves are concerned with actual output, not “effort.” Hours per worker has fallen 
overtime because workers have taken advantage of technology and become more 
productive per hour. With that being said, there is some concern that the U.S. will soon 
begin to see a decline in total hours worked nationally due to the retirement of the Baby 
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Boomer generation. A shrinking working age population definitely poses a risk to future 
real GDP growth because it could cause a decline in total hours worked. 
This risk is especially prevalent post-Great Recession because nationally there has 
been hardly any growth in output per hour over the last few years. Tables 7 and 8 show 
real GDP growth broken down into two components: growth in output per hour and growth 
in hours worked:15 
Table 7: Real GDP as a function of productivity and hours worked, 2001-2006 
Year Growth in Output per Hour Growth in Hours Real GDP Growth 
2001 1.99% -1.10% 0.89% 
2002 2.57% -0.91% 1.66% 
2003 2.91% -0.47% 2.44% 
2004 2.23% 1.19% 3.42% 
2005 1.64% 1.43% 3.07% 
2006 0.67% 1.93% 2.60% 
 
Table 8: Real GDP as a function of productivity and hours worked, 2011-2015 
Year Growth in Output per Hour Growth in Hours Real GDP Growth 
2011 -0.20% 1.64% 1.45% 
2012 -0.06% 2.02% 1.97% 
2013 -0.50% 1.71% 1.21% 
2014 0.00% 2.15% 2.15% 
2015 0.36% 1.98% 2.34% 
 
                                               
15 GDP = (Y/H)*H. Therefore, growth rates can be decomposed into growth in hourly 
productivity plus growth in hours. 
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Tables 7 and 8 show that U.S growth in output is increasingly driven by increases 
in hours worked and not productivity growth. This is a potentially dangerous trend because 
as the Baby Boomer generation retires, hours worked may decline. If that happens and 
productivity per hour does not improve, future U.S. real GDP growth rates stand to decline. 
Unlike the overall output per industry figures, output per hour has slowed down across the 
entire economy. When comparing average growth in output per hour from 2001 to 2006 to 
average growth in output per hour from 2010 to 2015, almost all of the industries saw 
declines in growth rates. Additionally, many of the industries that improved, only improved 
in absolute terms but are still shrinking. That is to say, some industries are still shrinking 
in output per hour, but are shrinking less than they were in the prior period. 
Table 9: Average growth rates in Y/H across selected time periods16 
Date 2001-2006 2010-2015 Difference 
U.S. 2.0% 0.3% -1.7% 
FIRE 1.9% 0.6% -1.4% 
Government 0.4% 0.2% -0.2% 
Professional and Business Services 1.6% 0.3% -1.3% 
Manufacturing 6.1% 0.4% -5.7% 
Education and Health 0.3% -0.5% -0.8% 
Wholesale trade 3.5% 1.7% -1.8% 
Retail trade 2.9% 1.0% -1.9% 
Information 10.3% 4.3% -6.0% 
Construction -2.7% -0.7% 2.0% 
Leisure and Hospitality 0.7% 0.2% -0.5% 
Transportation and Warehousing 2.7% -1.7% -4.4% 
Mining -1.4% 1.4% 2.8% 
Other Services -1.3% -0.1% 1.2% 
Utilities -0.3% 0.3% 0.6% 
Agriculture 5.1% 0.8% -4.3% 
                                               
16 Rows are organized by share of total GDP. 
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Real GDP growth rates are suffering from the inability to increase productivity 
throughout the entire economy. The causes of the stagnation are difficult to determine; 
perhaps a lack in recent innovation like Gordon hypothesizes is the cause. Regardless, 
average growth in output per hour of 2% per year prior to the Great Recession (2001-2006) 
fell to an average of 0% per year post Great Recession (2011-2015). In the same time 
period, average growth in hours worked increased from .6% per year to 1.9% per year. The 
2 percentage point decline in productivity is partially covered by the 1.3 percentage point 
increase in hours worked between the two periods. Still, a gap of about 0.7 percentage 
points per year of growth appears on average between the two time periods. Thus, the 
conclusion can be made that a fall in industry-wide productivity growth has been 
responsible for about 0.7 percentage points of growth rate decline per year since the Great 
Recession ended.  
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IV. Analysis by States 
A. Overview 
In addition to industry analysis, another way of looking at real GDP figures is as a 
sum of the underlying states. By identity, the sum of state GDP and national GDP are the 
same.17 Similar to the analysis of industry data, it’s possible that output by state declined 
equally throughout the country, or it is possible that recent growth struggles are being 
driven by specific regions or states.  
Comparing average real GDP growth from 1968-2008 to average real GDP growth 
from 2010-2015 shows that growth rates have declined across the country.18 The only 
significant exception to that rule is North Dakota whose economy grew tremendously in 
recent years during the fracking boom. There are no trends across the various regions of 
the country, and there are no trends across states of different sizes.19 The only noticeable 
trend is that most  every state across the country has performed worse since the Great 
Recession ended. The average decline across all 50 states is about 1.5 percentage points, 
which is similar to the 1.2 percentage point decline seen in the U.S. across the same period. 
                                               
17 The Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates national GDP figures using various estimation 
methods. Because of this, there are slight discrepancies between the summation of state GDP and 
the reported national GDP. However, these discrepancies are negligible, so for the purposes of the 
paper I will ignore the distinction. 
18 Real GDP by States is not available prior to 1985. I used Nominal GDP from 1968-2015 and 
adjusted for inflation using the Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator. The BEA 
recommends using the national GDP Price Deflator to adjust nominal state data. 
19 I compared changes in growth rates a variety of ways across the eight BEA defined regions and 
was not able find that one region was the worst. Looking at the question from various angles 
concludes different regions as the worst or best. For example, the Great Lakes region does the 
worst in the few years before the recession, but has done relatively well since then. The Far West 
Region has the opposite pattern. Also, variation across states in the region is extremely large, so 
none of the differences in mean growth rates by region are statistically significant. 
29 
 
While the national decline and average state decline are similar, this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. The size of a state's economy influences the degree to which 
its individual performance affects the nation as a whole. For example, Vermont’s real GDP 
in 2015 was only 1% the size of California’s real GDP. Weighting average growth rate 
declines by the size of the state economy will tell precisely how much each state has 
contributed to the national decline in real GDP growth rates. The following Equation 4 
was used:  
(Average Share of Total Real GDP(2010-2015)*Average Real GDP Growth(2010-
2015)) - (Average Share of Total Real GDP(1968-2006)*Average Real GDP 
Growth(1968-2006)) = Contribution to National Decline 
With each state weighted for its relative importance to the U.S. economy we can 
see by how much states have contributed to the 1.2 percentage point decline. Figure 6 (on 
page 31) shows the percentage point contribution of each state to the overall national 
decline. The x-axis is organized from largest contributor to smallest contributor. The grey 
area shows the total U.S. percentage point decline as each state is added. 
The concave down shape of the overall grey area reveals that much of the decline 
is concentrated in just a few states. The first ten largest contributors (Florida - Maryland) 
account for almost 60% of the total national decline. Many of these states are simply more 
populous such as Florida and California; however, size is not a commonality among the 
group. Connecticut is the tenth largest contributor, but the twenty-ninth largest state. 
Further, some of the largest states are near the bottom of the list in terms of contribution. 
Texas, for example, is the second largest state, but fiftieth in terms of contribution. Overall, 
there are several states that are really driving the national growth rate decline. However, 
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these states vary by size, industry expertise, and geographic location, so there is really no 
obvious similarity among poor performing states. Finding a commonality would have 
perhaps offered insight into what is wrong with the economy nationally. 
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 Figure 6 
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B. Panel Data Analysis 
The dataset I used is a panel of all fifty states from 1991 to 2015. Each state at each 
given point in time has a growth rate and shares of total employment in Manufacturing, 
FIRE, Education and Health, and Professional and Business Services.20 The percentage 
point changes in growth rates and percentage point changes in Manufacturing, FIRE, 
Education and Health, Professional and Business Services employment shares were all 
calculated year over year. The goal of this analysis is to determine if changes in structural 
employment fundamentally drives real growth rate changes in the U.S. To answer this 
question I look at a panel of fifty states and control for the differences across them using 
entity fixed effects.21 Earlier parts of the paper already provided the intuition that growth 
rates are affected by structural employment, but proving that these relationships hold true 
across all fifty states over an extended time period would provide an excellent “punch line.” 
The regression uses two-way fixed effects to control for entity fixed effects and 
time fixed effects. There are an innumerable amount of unique characteristics that differ 
across states and that might also influence their individual growth rates. Using entity fixed 
effects controls for the variation across the panel of states. Time fixed effects control for 
some event that affects all the states at the same time. For example, using time fixed effects 
controls for a recession. The following regression was used to model changes in growth 
rates across the panel of states: 
(𝐺𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝑖,𝑡−1) =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛾2𝐷1992 + ⋯ + 𝛾24𝐷2015 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡             (5) 
                                               
20 These are the four largest industries by GDP excluding Government. 
21 I assume a panel of all fifty states is a good proxy for the national economy.  
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Where i= Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,..., Wyoming, t = 1991, 1992,..., 2015, α = fixed 
effects, D = Time Dummy variable, and uit = error. The left hand side of the equation can 
be thought of as the percentage point change in the real GDP growth rate from one year to 
the next, and the right hand side of the equation can be thought of as the percentage point 
change in employment share of a selected industry. Running the regression will estimate a 
coefficient for β1. A positive β1 can be thought of as follows: the largest declines in 
employment share in industry “x” generate the greatest losses in real GDP growth rates. 
Figure 7 is a general diagram that helps to understand the coefficients on the 
independent variables. A positive regression coefficient indicates that an increase in that 
industry’s share of employment results in a rising growth rate relative to the prior year. 
Figure 7: Diagram to Help Understand Regression Coefficients 
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The following tables relate the results of the regressions. I ran several to show the 
influence that controlling for two-way fixed effects has on the regression coefficients: 
Table 10: Definitions of Regression Variables 
Variable Definition 
change_grate The growth rate in a given year minus the growth rate in the prior year 
change_man The percent share of total employment in Manufacturing in a given year 
minus the percent share of total employment in Manufacturing in the prior 
year 
change_FIRE The percent share of total employment in FIRE in a given year  
minus the percent share of total employment in FIRE in the prior year 
change_eh The percent share of total employment in Education and Health in a given 
year  
minus the percent share of total employment in Education and Health in the 
prior year 
change_pb The percent share of total employment in Professional and Business 
Services in a given year minus the percent share of total employment in 
Professional and Business Services in the prior year 
change_gov The percent share of total employment in Government in a given year  
minus the percent share of total employment in Government in the prior 
year 
y91 Dummy Variable for 1991 
y92 Dummy Variable for 1992 
. . 
. . 
. . 
y15 Dummy Variable for 2015 
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Table 11: Selected Regressions22 
Regressor (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
change_man 0.57* 
(0.32) 
  0.12 
(0.37) 
0.87** 
(0.36) 
0.39 
(0.42) 
0.14 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.46) 
-0.13 
(0.46) 
change_eh   -1.11** 
(0.38) 
-1.03** 
(0.45) 
  -1.00** 
(0.47) 
-0.43 
(0.54) 
  0.51*** 
(0.17) 
change_fire           -1.01 
(1.09) 
  0.15 
(0.32) 
change_pb           1.43*** 
(0.56) 
  0.14 
(0.18) 
State 
Effects? 
No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time 
Effects? 
No No No No No No Yes Yes 
 
Table 11 relates eight regressions which correspond with the numbers in 
parenthesis in the first row. Regressions one and two regress change in Manufacturing 
employment share and change in Education and Health employment share individually on 
the change in growth rates. These simple models reveal interesting results. Since the 
coefficient on change in Manufacturing share is positive and statistically significant, this 
tells us that a 1 percentage point increase in the Manufacturing share will result in a 0.57 
increase in the growth rate from the prior year. A 0.57 percentage point increase in the 
growth rate is substantial; however, a jump that large in one year never actually occurs. 
Across all fifty states for 25 years the largest jump was a -0.02 percentage point decline, 
which corresponds to about a 0.01 percentage point decline in the real GDP growth rate. 
                                               
22 Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions use data from 
1991-2015. 
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Further, the model explains virtually none of the variation changes in real GDP growth 
rates. However, because the variable is statistically significant, we can at least say that 
increases in Manufacturing share have a positive effect on real GDP growth. 
In regression two the results for change in Education and Health share show that 
increases in employment share produces declines in the growth rate. Similar to 
Manufacturing, while the coefficient is statistically significant, the maximum year over 
year change in reality was only a 0.014 percentage point increase, which results in a rather 
negligible effect on the growth rate. 
Mean changes in employment shares across the entire panel for Manufacturing 
were negative at the 99% confidence level, and mean changes in employment shares across 
the entire panel for Education and Health were positive at the 99% confidence level. This 
provides some evidence that overtime growth rates have been consistently damaged by 
declining employment share in Manufacturing and increasing employment share in 
Education and Health. The result corresponds nicely with the results found earlier in the 
paper; however, the simple regressions have large potential for omitted variable bias. 
Looking to regressions four and five which introduce fixed effects, the results are 
not altered significantly. Regression five combines change in Manufacturing share and 
change in Education and Health share. The resulting output eliminates the significance of 
the coefficient on the change in Manufacturing share, but Education and Health maintains 
a statistically significant negative slope, so the same conclusions can be reached. 
Regression six also introduces fixed effects and includes all four industries. In this model 
the only statistically significant variable is change in Professional and Business Services 
share. The coefficient is positive and relatively high at 1.43. Logically this result makes 
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some sense. The Professional and Business Services industry has continued to grow in 
productivity per worker nationally despite enormous increases in employment starting in 
the late 1990s. Unlike Education and Health, jobs in Professional and Business Services 
are much higher paying and offer a good substitute to the Manufacturing jobs that have 
been lost. 
Regressions seven and eight introduce two-way fixed effects. Regression seven is 
curious because the coefficient on the change in Manufacturing share is essentially zero, 
and there is no statistical significance. This is a sharp contrast with the results found in 
regressions one and four. This shows that changes in Manufacturing employment share 
offer no explanatory value above and beyond what the business cycle tells us. 
Regression eight uses all four independent variables along with the two-way fixed 
effects. In this model the only statistically significant variable is the change in Education 
and Health employment share. The coefficient in this case is positive, which is opposite 
what was seen in the previous models. Regression eight says that increases in employment 
share in Education and Health actually help increase growth rates once you control for 
other industries and the two-way fixed effects. The implications of this result are puzzling 
because previous analysis in this paper showed that employment share is best placed in 
industries with the fastest growing productivity. Education and Health has had virtually no 
increase in productivity over the last fifteen years. 
Looking at this panel data had the potential to reveal something fundamental about 
the relationships between changes in growth rates and structural changes in employment. 
The results of the regression analysis are essentially inconclusive, as the most robust model 
(regression 8) yielded results that do not make sense logically. Clearly the models are 
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missing key components as to what is driving changes in growth rates across the panel of 
states. 
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V. Conclusion 
The topic of real GDP growth rates is important because economic growth is a 
reflection of our economic and financial improvement as a society. Obviously, we want as 
many people as possible earning more and improving their standard of living. 
Unfortunately, U.S. real GDP has stopped growing at its historical trend of about 3% per 
year. This is especially bad considering the change in growth rates occurred after a severe 
recession. The recession coupled with the stagnating economy has resulted in a “Lost 
Decade” for many Americans. 
Theory as to why growth rates have fallen ranges widely. Explanations include 
everything from overregulation to demographic changes to declining innovation. This 
paper attempts to explain the gap by examining different components which sum together 
to form real GDP. 
Section II, A holds structural employment by industry constant at historical levels. 
The analysis yields high estimated real GDP figures and begins to explain the current gap. 
It also tells us that real GDP has been negatively affected by changes in structural 
employment, specifically movement from the Manufacturing industry to the Education and 
Health and Leisure and Hospitality industries. 
Section II, B analyzes real GDP by output per hour and total hours worked. It shows 
that stagnated productivity growth across almost every industry has negatively affected 
real GDP growth rates. Additionally, it showed that real GDP growth in the last few years 
has been exclusively driven by increases in hours worked rather than by increases in 
productivity. This suggests that growth is at risk of falling as the nation’s demographics 
change. 
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Section III, A analyzes real GDP as the summation of all fifty states.  The analysis 
shows that about ten states are responsible for the majority of the economic downturn. 
However, looking at both their individual performance and their contribution to national 
decline, I was unable to find any similarities across the worst performing states. One would 
expect to see some commonality among the worst performing states- perhaps by geography 
or industry concentration. Given the results of the analysis of national industries, it seemed 
logical to assume that states with economies centered around Manufacturing would be 
contributing the most to national decline; however, this is not the case. There are definitely 
common misconceptions that the worst performing states are isolated to the “Rust Belt.” 
Section II, B looks to see if changes in employment share of major industries 
fundamentally drive growth rate changes in the U.S. To answer this question, I look at a 
panel of fifty states and control for the differences across them using entity fixed effects. 
The results of this section are inconclusive. While simple models do show the hypothesized 
relationship between industry employment share and growth rates, once two-way fixed 
effects are introduced the results are either statistically insignificant or illogical. 
The regression analysis focused on structural employment changes as the driving 
factor in growth rate changes across the U.S., but this culminated in rather inconclusive 
results. Future research on this topic could dive further into industry analysis of the worst 
performing states in an attempt to learn from them or look at a panel of states overtime and 
analyze something other than structural employment. 
This paper was introduced with some resoundingly negative quotes about the state 
of the U.S. economy, and the paper itself adds some validity to their claims by showing 
that our economy is not performing as well as it has in years past. With this in mind, I 
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would like to end the conversation with a quote from an interview with Robert Gordon, 
whose book The Rise and Fall of American Growth was the primary motivation for this 
paper. The interviewer, Stephen Dubner of Freakonomics, after a conversation with 
Gordon on growth rates, adds an interesting perspective to the challenges that our economy 
and our society face today: 
“Gordon’s economic conversation tells a different story – that our runaway growth 
of the past was essentially a golden age. No one has taken away our electricity, or 
clean water, or refrigeration or air conditioning and the antibiotics and cars and 
telephones, smart or dumb phones. And it may be that once so many of these 
external, concrete needs have been met, what’s left is the really hard stuff: the 
internal needs. Things like psychological and cognitive gains. Learning to find true 
happiness. Or, perhaps better yet, to be satisfied with what we have. If you could 
achieve that, then yes, it might make even electricity and clean water and antibiotics 
seem like pretty basic stuff.” 
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VI. Data Appendix 
Variables Source 
Employment,  State and National Level Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Employment by Industry, State and National Level Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Real Gross Domestic Product, National Level  Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Real Gross Domestic Product per Capita Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Real Median Gross Domestic Product Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
Real Gross Domestic Product by Industry, National Level  Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Gross Domestic Product, State Level Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Hours by Industry, National Level Federal Reserve 
Economic Database 
State Population United States Census 
Bureau 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
VII. References 
 
 
Autor, D and Dorn, D. 2013. “The Growth of Low-Skill Service Jobs and the Polarization  
of the US Labor Market.” American Economic Review, 103(5): 1553–1597. 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/1474. 
 
Autor, D. 2010. "The Polarization of Job Opportunities in the U.S. Labor Market." The  
Hamilton Project and The Center for American Progress. 
http://economics.mit.edu/files/5554. 
 
Canon, M and Marifian, E. 2013. “Job Polarization Leaves Middles-Skilled Workers Out  
in the Cold.” The Regional Economist, January. 
 
Center for Economic and Policy Research. 2012. CEPR. March 30. Accessed November 
2016. 
 
Fair, R. 1996. "Econometrics and Presidential Elections." The Journal of Economic  
Perspectives 10, no. 3: 89-102. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138521. 
 
Ganzel, B. 2009. "Farming and Rural Life in the 1970's to Today." Living History Farm.  
 
Gordon, R. 2016. The Rise and Fall of American Growth. New Jersey: Princeton University  
Press. 
 
Gordon, R. 2012. “Is the U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the  
Six Headwinds by Robert J. Gordon.” National Bureau of Economic Research No.  
18315: 1-25. http://www.nber.org/papers/w18315.pdf. 
 
Leamer, E. 2009. Macroeconomic Patterns and Stories. Berlin: Springer. 
 
Mercile, D and Struyven, D. 2016. “How Much Further to Full Employment?” US  
Economics Analyst: 1-12.  
 
Schniepp, M. 2016. “So if we now have a ‘full employment’ economy, why aren’t you  
convinced?” California Economic Forecast, October 19. 
 
Stephen, D. “Yes the American Economy is in a Funk – But Not for the Reasons You  
Think.” FreakonomicsRadio. Podcast Audio, March 16, 2016.  
 
Taylor, J. 2009. “The financial crisis and the policy responses: An empirical analysis of  
what went wrong.” National Bureau of Economic Research No. w14631. 
 
Yuskavage, R. 2007. “Converting Historical Industry Time Series Data from SIC to  
NAICS.” U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
